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Abstract
In their recent paper, Natalie Banner and Tim Thornton evaluate seven volumes of the Oxford
University Press series “International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry,” an international
book series begun in 2003 focusing on the emerging interdisciplinary field at the interface of
philosophy and psychiatry. According to Natalie Banner and Tim Thornton, the series represents
a clear indication that the interdisciplinary field of philosophy of psychiatry has been flourishing
lately. Philosophers and psychiatrists face a “new philosophy of psychiatry”. However, the optimism
which the “new” philosophy of psychiatry celebrates is precisely the exiling of philosophy from the
foundations of psychiatry. The 150 year old belief that psychopathology cannot do without
philosophical reflection has virtually disappeared from common psychiatric education and daily
clinical practice. Though the discipline of psychiatry is particularly suited to contributions from
philosophy, the impact of philosophy on psychiatry nowadays remains limited. With some
exceptions, philosophical papers are embedded in a philosophical context inscrutable to ordinary
psychiatrists. Much current philosophical work is perceived by psychiatrists as negativistic. I would
encourage the field of psychiatry to incorporate once again basic philosophical attitudes which
render possible true dialogue with philosophy and enrich both disciplines. The views developed
here should not discredit the value and importance of Natalie Banner and Tim Thornton’s paper
and the excellent series “International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry.” As Jaspers said
“Everybody inclined to disregard philosophy will be overwhelmed by philosophy in an unperceived
way”.
In their recent paper, Natalie Banner and Tim Thornton
evaluate seven volumes of the Oxford University Press
series "International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psy-
chiatry". Launched in 2003, "International Perspectives in
Philosophy and Psychiatry" is an international book
series focusing on the emerging interdisciplinary field at
the interface of philosophy and psychiatry.
Natalie Banner and Tim Thornton identify three broad
interconnected themes in the series: the role of values in
psychiatric diagnosis and treatment; the question of the
place of understanding subjects' experiences, their mean-
ings and the relationship of understanding to natural sci-
entific explanation, and the scientific status of the 'facts' or
'evidence' that contribute towards psychiatric diagnoses.
The three themes correspond with the three main parts of
Tim Thornton's new book "Essential Philosophy of Psy-
chiatry" meant to be a concise introduction to the growing
field of philosophy of psychiatry. The first part, Values,
outlines the debate about whether diagnosis of mental ill-
ness is essentially value-laden and argues that the pros-
pects for reducing illness or disease to plainly factual
matters are poor. The second part, Meanings, examines the
central role of understanding and a shared first person
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perspective, both against attempts to reduce meaning to
basic information-processing mechanisms and to explain
away the difficulties of understanding psychopathology.
The third part, Facts, shows the importance of uncodified
clinical judgments, both in assessing the validity of psy-
chiatric taxonomy and in the application of Evidence
Based Medicine.
According to Natalie Banner and Tim Thornton, the series
represents a clear indication that the interdisciplinary field
of philosophy of psychiatry has been flourishing lately.
There has been recent growth in the philosophy of psychi-
atry during the past fifteen years. Philosophers and psy-
chiatrists face a "new philosophy of psychiatry" in
addition to analytic philosophy and to the broader inter-
pretation of mental health care.
How new is this new philosophy of psychiatry? Does the
new philosophy really impact on the field of psychiatry?
Should we share Natalie Banner and Tim Thornton's opti-
mism?
Since psychiatry has been established as a field of medi-
cine, psychiatric literature has always been full of philo-
sophical thought and direct reference to philosophy. "Just
meditations for the philosopher who, liberated from the daily
turmoil, walks through a psychiatric hospital! He will find the
same ideas, the same errors, the same passions, the same ill-
fated: it's the same world, but in this house, traits are more pro-
nounced, nuances much sharper, colors more vivid, lives more
shattered, because man are naked, they don't conceal their
thoughts, hide their shortcomings, they don't draw on their pas-
sions to articulate charming seduction, on their vices to express
deceiving appearances" [1]. The broad themes: values,
meanings and facts identified by Natalie Banner and Tim
Thornton in the recent series have been examined in psy-
chiatry for many years. Bertrand Morel discusses in his
"Traité des maladies mentales" (1850) the role of political
and religious values in psychiatry referring to Rousseau
and Locke [2]. Jaspers' project of the General Psychopa-
thology (1913) originally aimed at examining facts and
perspectives in psychiatry thereby using "meaning" from
Dilthey (1900) as a methodological tool [3]. The validity
of psychiatric diagnoses, the relation between scientific
explanation and human understanding, and the scientific
status of psychiatric facts have been studied extensively by
Continental phenomenological psychiatrists. For my part,
the recent themes of the new philosophy of psychiatry are
just an extension or repetition of earlier work of the last
centuries. There has always been a longstanding debate on
truth, method and the scientific status of psychiatric
knowledge, and questions about the possibility of true
knowledge in psychiatry are inherent to psychiatric think-
ing.
Nevertheless, I agree with Natalie Banner and Tim Thorn-
ton that something has radically changed within the field
of psychiatry and philosophy during the past fifteen years.
The novelty is not that philosophy has reconquered psy-
chiatry, but that psychiatry has lost philosophy. Philo-
sophical thinking used to be embedded in psychiatry. This
was self-evident since psychiatry and philosophy share
interest in the same matters – reality, freedom, personal
identity, social reality, perception, free will, thought and
affect. However, the belief that psychopathology cannot
do without philosophical reflection, so obvious the last
150 years, has recently vanished. Reflecting, conceptual
thinking, questioning, and criticizing have all virtually
disappeared from common psychiatric education and
daily clinical practice. Jaspers was a resident in psychiatry
and not a philosopher when he wrote his "General Psy-
chopathology." Unfortunately, the vital, basic philosoph-
ical attitude of naive astonishment towards psychiatric
phenomena is no longer part of residency training. Philos-
ophy has left the psychiatric building. It is exiled from psy-
chiatry, externalized and sequestered in the "new"
philosophy of psychiatry.
The loss of critical philosophical thinking in psychiatry
has led on one hand to the shameful conclusion that zool-
ogists are much more accurate and subtle than psychia-
trists in the observation of behavior. "The available
analysis of the phenomenology of compulsive rituals
pales before elegant observations of analogous behaviors
in fish and birds" Thomas Insel (1988) [4]. The loss has
led on the other hand to the necessity of two different dis-
ciplines both struggling to detect a fruitful crossover. I
agree with Natalie Banner and Tim Thornton that the dis-
cipline of psychiatry is particularly suited to contributions
from philosophy. However, the impact of philosophy on
psychiatry is still limited. Though the conditions for sys-
tematic thought over the last decades have changed fun-
damentally – not only phenomenology is at our disposal
but the philosophy of mind – they have not yet been used
widely to deal with psychopathological problems. The
focus in training is on scientific knowledge, such as clini-
cal neuroscience, behavioural and social sciences. There is
very little content devoted to anthropology and philoso-
phy in relation to psychiatry [5]. The language of aca-
demic philosophy is not the language of bedside
psychiatry. With some exceptions, philosophical papers
are so dense, so laden with jargon, and so embedded in a
philosophical context inscrutable to the ordinary psychia-
trist that their message is lost. Moreover, much of current
philosophical work is criticism, emphasizing the limita-
tions of modernist thinking and rejecting its claims, and
critically analyzing the conceptual foundations of aca-
demic psychiatry. The majority of the reviewed seven vol-
umes of the Oxford University Press series "International
Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry" criticizePublish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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present psychiatric values, meanings and facts. Coming
from outside, the criticism is perceived by psychiatrists as
negativistic and the deconstruction as destructive.
In my opinion, neuroscience is currently much more suc-
cessful in embracing philosophy than psychiatry. Philoso-
phy interacts positively with neuroscience and the
philosophy of neuroscience is accepted as a natural result.
The emerging area of philosophy of neuroscience cer-
tainly was spurred by remarkable recent growth in the
neurosciences. Cognitive neuroscience continues to
encroach upon issues traditionally addressed within phi-
losophy, including the nature of consciousness, action,
knowledge, and morality. Examining the implications of
neurological syndromes for the concept of a unified self as
well as studying the neural systems underlying appraisal
and its relevance to the self is one example [6]. Other
examples (among many) include: The concept of neu-
rophenomenology, introduced by Francesco Varela into
neuroscience, in which observers examine their conscious
experience using scientifically verifiable methods [7]. The
use of deep brain electrical stimulation to modulate
behavioral responsiveness in a patient who remains in a
minimal conscious state (thereby offering a new tool to
comprehend consciousness) [8]. Another topic examines
threatened morality and physical cleansing, or the neural
constituents of moral cognition [9]. Or the investigation
of subjective certainty and its relationship to dopamine
alterations in the striatum [10].
In closing, I agree that we live in interesting philosophical
times in which there is potential for a fruitful crossover
between the disciplines of philosophy and psychiatry.
However, I disagree that there needs be a "new" cross-over
between philosophy and psychiatry as regards values,
meaning and facts. These three themes must necessarily
be – as they have historically been – intrinsic to psychiat-
ric thinking, as their "self evidence" has shaped psychiatry
as a distinctive medical science. I would encourage the
field of psychiatry to incorporate once again basic philo-
sophical attitudes which render possible true dialogue
with philosophy and consequently enrich both disci-
plines. At the moment, for most practicing psychiatrists,
philosophy is a bridge too far.
The views that I develop here should not discredit the
value and importance of Natalie Banner and Tim Thorn-
ton's paper and the excellent series "International Perspec-
tives in Philosophy and Psychiatry." I hope that my
comments that were inspired by their thoughtful paper
may help emphasize the importance of philosophical
reflection within psychiatry. As Jaspers said "Everybody
inclined to disregard philosophy will be overwhelmed by
philosophy in an unperceived way".
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